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Restitution of Benefits Conferred
Under Minors' Contracts
JOHN D. McCAMUS*
This article gives an account of the law relating to restitutionary
recovery for benefits conferred by parties to agreements which are
unenforceable as a result of the minority of one of the parties. It is
argued that the case law offers rules which are inconsistent and
unsatisfactoy in policy terms but that a sound judicial restatement of
them utilizing themes developed in the Canadian cases is both possible
and desirable.
A. INTRODUCTION
In order to protect persons below the age of majority' from the
harsh consequences of being compelled to perform what may have been a
rash and improvident undertaking, the courts of common law developed
a complex cluster of rules which permit minors to refuse to perform
certain categories of agreements. 2 The rules which establish whether or
not a particular undertaking is binding attempt to balance the objective
of releasing minors from potentially oppressive bargains against a number
of competing interests. First, there is a general public interest served by
rules which foster the stability of transactions. This interest will
obviously be felt most keenly by the other party to the transaction and
by third party creditors or subpurchasers who may be detrimentally
affected by the holding of unenforceability. Secondly, minors them-
selves may have an interest in being able to give an undertaking which
is enforceable at law. The common law has responded to the task of
reconciling these interests by developing a number of different categories
of transactions to which are attributed various degrees of enforceability.
These categories are briefly described in the next section of this paper as
*M.A., 1965, LL.B., 1968 (Toronto), LL.M., 1969 (London). Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall
Law School, York University.
'The .age of majority at common law is 21. In Canada, the age of majority has been reduced by
statute. In six provincial jurisdictions - Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec
and Saskatchewan - it is now 18 years of age. See S.A. 1971, c.l., s.1; S.M. 1970, c.91, s.1;
S.O. 1971, c.98, s.i; R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c.A-3, s.i; S.Q. 1971, c.85, s.3; S.S. 1972, c.l., s.2. In the other
provinces and in the territorial jurisdictions it is now 19 years of age. See S.B.C. 1970, c.1, s.I;
R.S.N.B. 1973, c.A-4, s.l; S.Nfld. 1971 c.71, s.6; S.N.S. 1970-71, c.10, s.2; R.O.Y.N.W.T. 1974,
c.A-1, s.2; O.Y.T. 1972, c.l, s.3.
'Apart from the standard works on contract, see, generally, D. R. Percy, The Present Law of Infants'
Contracts (1975), 53 Can. B. Rev. I.
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a necessary preliminary to the topic at hand, restitution of benefits
conferred under agreements which are unenforceable by reason of the
minority of one of the parties.
This paper considers in some detail the law relating to the
restitutionary problems which arise once it has been established that the
agreement which the minor has entered into is an unenforceable one. If the
minor has already conferred benefits on the other party to the agreement,
may he recover their value in a restitutionary claim? If the other party
has conferred benefits upon the minor, may he recover their value?
Or, alternatively, should the minor be required to make restitution of the
value of benefits which he has received as a condition of being permitted
to invoke the rule which renders the agreement unenforceable? As will
be seen, the rules relating to these questions are also complex, indeed,
perhaps more so than the enforceability rules.
As a prelude to an examination of the restitutionary case law, it is
useful to consider the nature of the competing interests which arise in
this context and to suggest a framework of analysis with which the cases
might be approached. In the first place, it is obvious that the party who
has, at his own expense, conferred a benefit on the other party has an
interest in recovering its value. The benefit was conferred in the course of
performing an apparent contractual duty and was thus clearly not
intended as a gift. As a general matter, this interest is one which has
received strong recognition in the common law. Parties to unenforceable
agreements are generally entitled to recover the value of benefits con-
ferred on the other party in performance of what were thought to be
binding contractual obligations.' The body of law which establishes this
proposition is now commonly regarded as constituting a major source of the
modern law of restitution.4 In Canada the underlying rationale for these
rules is expressed in the general principle of unjust enrichment.'
There is evident merit in permitting at least some recovery premised
on the unjust enrichment rationale in the context of minors' agreements.
Certainly, so far as benefits conferred by the minor upon the adult party
are concerned, it is difficult to conceive of an argument against granting
the minor a restitutionary award for the value of the benefit conferred.
There may also, in certain cases, be much to be said in support of a
restitutionary claim brought by the adult party. A convincing case can be
3See generally R. Goff and G. Jones, The Law of Restitution (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1966),
at 16-25. And see, J. D. McCamus, Restitutionay Remedies in Special Lectures of the Law Society of
Upper Canada, 1975, at 255-299.
41bid.
"The leading Canadian authority adopting the unjust enrichment principle and rejecting the
"implied contract" rationale is Degiman v. Guaranty Trust Co. and Constantineau, [1954] S.C.R. 725;
[1954] 3 D.L.R. 785 (contract unenforceable for want of formality, recovery allowed for value of
benefit conferred). And see, American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Restitution (1937), s.l
("A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution
to the other.").
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made on policy grounds for the recovery of the value of necessaries
supplied to the minor.6 Were the rule otherwise, minors might have
difficulty obtaining necessaries on a credit basis. The argument in favour
of a general right of recovery for benefits conferred on the minor is more
tenuous. In support, it might be argued that a rule which uniformly
denied a right of restitutionary recovery to adults who have dealt in good
faith might encourage irresponsible and exploitative conduct on the part
of minors. On the other hand, relentless pursuit of the restitutionary
interests of the supplier in this context could have the effect of under-
mining the objectives underlying the rules which render the agreement
unenforceable. A rule which invariably permitted the adult party to recover
the value of benefits conferred might have the effect of rewarding sharp
practice of a kind which the unenforceability rule is designed to dis-
courage. Further, there may be situations in which the imposition on
the minor of a duty to make restitution may subvert the policy of per-
mitting minors to resile from unwise bargains. For example, in cases
where the benefit conferred has been consumed or wasted, the imposition
of a restitutionary duty to pay for its reasonable value may be as offensive
to the underlying policy as would direct enforcement of the bargain.
In sum, there are strong arguments to be made in favour of recovery
on unjust enrichment grounds where the minor has conferred a benefit on
the other party to the unenforceable agreement. Further, an adult party
who has supplied necessaries should be entitled to relief. More generally,
one who has dealt in good faith with the minor should also be entitled
to recovery subject to the proviso that such relief ought not be awarded
where to do so would subvert the policy of affording special protection
to young and inexperienced bargainers.
For reasons considered further below, the case law, particularly
the English case law, has not developed a pattern which conforms closely
to this model. Although some measure of restitutionary relief is accorded
to both parties under the English rules, an examination of the nature of
such relief and the circumstances in which it has been granted does not
reveal a consistent approach to the problem of resolving the competing
interests articulated above. Indeed, it appears to be generally agreed
that the English law is unsatisfactory. In 1967, the Latey Committee Report
recommended statutory reform which would extend restitutionary
recovery, as a general rule, to both parties.
7
'See, infra, the text at footnotes 32 to 45.
'See, Report of the Committee on the Age of Majority (1967), Cmnd. 3342 (hereinafter, the Latey Report)
secs. 309-319. Although the Ontario Law Reform Commission in its 1969 Report on the Age of
Majority and Related Matters, 53 et seq., indicates some hesitation with respect to the imposition of
restitutionary duties on the minor (subject to a judicial discretion to relieve), the general thrust of
this aspect of the Latey proposals has gained acceptance elsewhere. See, e.g., Alberta Institute of
Law Research and Reform, Report No. 14, Minors' Contracts (1975), 29-33; Law Reform Commission
of British Columbia, Report on Minors' Contracts (1976), 28-32; the New Zealand Minors' Contracts
Act, S.N.Z. 1969, No. 41; the New South Wales Minors (Property and Contracts) Act, S.N.S.W. 1970,
No. 60. For a thorough treatment of the latter, see D. J. Hartland, The Law of Minors in Relation
to Contracts and Property (Sydney: Butterworths, 1974).
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It is argued below, however, that a close reading of the Canadian
case law suggests that considerable progress has been made by Canadian
courts in developing restitutionary rules which are less random in their
application and which, in their substance, approach more closely the
analytical framework which has been proposed here.
B. THE RULES RELATING TO THE ENFORCEABILITY OF
MINORS' CONTRACTS
The general rule at common law is that minors' agreements do not
bind the infant party unless the agreement has been ratified by the infant
after reaching the age of majority.8 Minors' contracts are thus voidable
in the rather unusual sense that they cannot be enforced against one of
the parties unless a ratification occurs.
There are a number of exceptions to this general rule. First, since
a complete immunity from contractual liability might be more of a
hindrance than a help to a self-supporting infant who must deal with
others, some types of agreements have been recognized as binding at
common law. This is the case with beneficial contracts of service and
apprenticeship. In some provinces, the enforceability of such agreements
has been made the subject of legislation.' It is also established that the
infant is liable for the reasonable value of goods and services supplied which
are "necessaries" in the requisite sense, though it is unclear whether this
liability is grounded in contract or restitution, a question considered
further below. Another general category of exceptional cases consists
of agreements by which the infant acquires an interest in a subject-
matter of a permanent nature which carries with it continuing or recurrent
aSee R. v. Rash (1923), 53 O.L.R. 245 (C.A.), at 257. et seq., per Rose J. And see, generally,
Percy, supra, footnote 2, at 12 et seq.
That the ratification must be evidenced in writing is a requirement introduced in England by
Lord Tenterden's Act (1828), 9 Ceo. IV, c.14, s.5. It has been adopted in some Canadian jurisdictions -
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario and Prince Edward Island - by statute. See R.S.N.B. 1973,
c.S-14, s.5; R.S.N.S. 1967, c.290, s.8; R.S.O. 1970, c.444, s.7; R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c.S-6, s.l. In others -
Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan - its effect derives from the reception of English law. See
Mo4eux v. Trail (1915), 32 W.L.R. 292; 9 W.W.R. 137 (Sask. D.C.). In England and British
Columbia, legislation rendering such ratifications unenforceable has been enacted. See the Infants
Relief Act (1874), 37 & 38 Vict., c.62, s.2 and the Infants Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c.193, s.3.
"For typical provisions, see e.g., the Infants Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c.193, s.4, and The Child We~fare
Act R.S.M. 1970, c. C-80, s.105 (contracts of service). See further, e.g., the Apprenticeship and
Tradesmen's Qualiykation Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c.13, s.16 and The Apprenticeship and Tradesmen's Qualifica-
tion Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.24, ss.13,14 and 15.
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obligations.'" Agreements to purchase land," conveyances,1 2 mortgages,1 3
and leases of land, 4  as well as agreements to purchase shares,'
5
partnership agreements,' 6 and marriage settlements' 7 are included in this
category and are said to be voidable in the more orthodox sense of
being valid and binding until repudiated by the infant, either before
attaining majority or within a reasonable time thereafter.1 " Again, the
enforceability of these types of agreements has been the subject of
legislation in some jurisdictions.19
Such were the exceptions to the general rule developed by the English
courts. To some extent, they may be seen as reflecting a concern to
prevent undue hardship to an adult dealing with an infant in good faith.
One further Canadian development must be noted, however, in which the
primacy of the interests of the infant has been asserted. Canadian courts
have recognized an additional category of exceptional cases consisting of
contracts which are "necessarily to the prejudice of the infant". Such
I°See, generally, Percy, supra, footnote 2, at 15 et seq.
"Whittingham v. Murdy (1889), 60 L.T. 956 (Q.B.D.); Thurstan v. Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building
Society [1902] 1 Ch. 1, 71 L.J. Ch. 83 (C.A.), afrd [1903] A.C. 6, 72 LJ. Ch. 134 (H.L.). And see,
generally, V. Di Castri, The Law of Vendor and Purchaser (2nd ed.), at 64 et seq.
"Foley v. Canada Permanent Loan and Savings Co. (1883), 4 O.R. 38 (D.C.); Whails v. Learn (1888),
15 O.R. 481 (D.C.); McDonald v. Restigouche Salmon Club (1896), 33 N.B.R. 472 (C.A.); Lauzon v.
Menard (1923), 25 O.W.N. 387 (H.C.).
"Foley v. Canada Permanent Loan and Savings Co., ibid
"Davies v. Beynon-Harris (1931), 47 T.L.R. 424 (K.B.) (infant lessee); Slator v. Trimble (1961),
14 Ir. C.LR. 342 (infant lessor).
"
5North Western Railway Co. v. McMichael (1850), 5 Ex. 114, 155 ER. 49; Sovereign Bank of Canada,
Clark's Case (1916), 27 D.L.R. 253 (Ont. C.A.); Re Central Bank and Hogg (1890), 19 O.R. 7 (D.C.);
In the Matter of Prudential Life Insurance Co.: Re Paterson, (1918] 1 W.W.R. 105 (Man. S.C.).
'The infant is not, however, liable during infancy for the debts of the firm. See Goode v.
Harrison (1821), 5 B. & Aid. 147, 106 E.R. 1147; Lovell & Christmas v. Beauchamp, [1894]
A.C. 607, 63 L.J. Q.B. 802 (H.L.). And see Woods v. Woods (1885), 3 Man. L.R. 33 (Q.B.).
"Duncan v. Dixon (1890), 44 Ch. D. 211; 59 L.J. Ch. 437; Edwards and Isaacs v. Carter, [1893]
A.C. 360, 63 L.J. Ch. 100 (H.L.).
"
5E.g., Edwards and Isaacs v. Carter, ibid; Murray v. Dean (1926), 30 O.W.N. 271 (H.C.); Hilliard v.
Dillon, [1955] O.W.N. 621 (H.C.). Though the right to repudiate and set aside the conveyance may
be lost where the minor has induced it by fraudulently misrepresenting his age: Wilbur v.Jones (1881),
21 N.B.R. 4 (C.A.); Gregson v. Law and Barry (1913), 15 D.L.R. 514, 5 W.W.R. 1017 (B.C.S.C.).
Sed quaere. A preterable explanation for the results in these cases is that third party rights had
intervened in that the property had been resold in each case to a bonafide purchaser.
"With regard to land transactions, see e.g., The Infants Act, R.S.A. 1970, c.185, ss.2-8; the Settled
Estates Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c.351, ss.3, 20 et seq; The Child Wefare Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. C-80,
ss.117-121; The Infants Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.222, ss.4-10; The Infants Act, R.S.S. 1965, c.342, ss.9-19.
With regard to marriage settlements see, e.g., The Infants Act, R.S.A. 1970, c.185, ss.1l-13, and
The Infants Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.222, ss.13-15.
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agreements are void, and hence, cannot be ratified.2" Although this
further refinement of an already complex area of the law has been
criticized, 2 1 it appears to provide, albeit inelegantly, solutions for two quite
distinct problems posed by the existing case law. First, the rules relating
to repudiation may have the effect of binding an infant to a contract
which is harsh and prejudicial if he sleeps on his rights after reaching
majority. This cannot happen where the agreement is held void.22
Similarly, an apparent ratification will be ineffective. 23  Second, some of
the difficulties present in the restitutionary rules under which the infant
may attempt to recover the value of benefits conferred under the agreement
may be ameliorated where the agreement has been held to be void at
common law.2 4 However, this additional category may operate as a mixed
blessing for the infant, by preventing enforcement of the agreement in
cases where its advantages are not outweighed, in the opinion of the
infant at least, by its disadvantages.
2 5
The common law rules relating to the enforceability of minors'
contracts were substantially modified in England by the Infants' Relief
"Beam v. Beatty (No. 2) (1902), 4 O.L.R. 554 (C.A.); Phillips v. Greater Ottawa Development Co.
(1916), 38 O.L.R. 315 (C.A.); Pyett v. Lampman (1922), 53 O.L.R. 149, [1923] 1 D.L.R. 249 (C.A.);
R. v. Rash, supra, footnote 8; McKay v. McKinley, [1933] O.W.N. 392 (H.C.); Ivan v. Hartley,
[1945] 4 D.L.R. 142 (Ont. H.C.); Butterfield v. Sibbit and Nipissing Electric Supply Company Limited,
[1950] O.R. 504 (H.C.); Re Staruch, [1955] 5 D.L.R. 807 (Ont. H.C.); Altobelli v. Wilson, [1957]
O.W.N. 207 (C.A.); Upper v. Lightning Fastener Employees' Credit Union (St. Catharines) Limited (1967),
9 C.B.R. (N.S.) 211 (Ont.). And see R. v. Leduc (1971), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 422 (Ont.). English authorities
supporting the existence of this category may be cited: see, e.g., Baylis v. Dinelev (1815). 3 M.&S.
477, 105 E.R. 689, and Viditz v. O'Hagan, [1900] 2 Ch. 87, 69 L.J. Ch. 507 (C.A.). But see infra,
footnote 2 1.
"Pollock, for example, argued that the view that some infants' contracts are void is contrary to
the weight of modern authority and criticized the distinction between void and voidable contracts
as unreasonable. See Pollock's Principles of the Law of Contracts, (13th ed.), at 4748. And see,
C. A. Wright, Note (1935), 13 Can. B. Rev. 319, at 323 where it is argued that this further category
is both undesirable and unnecessary for the protection of the interests of the minor. Pollock's
view appears to have prevailed in England. Thus, modern English treatises on the law of contract
do not consider a separate category of "void" contracts. In Chitty on Contracts (23rd ed.), vol. 1,
at 164, note 12, it is suggested that in the earlier cases, "where the word 'void' was used 'voidable'
was intended." The void contract doctrine has been abandoned by American courts as well.
See, e.g., Wiliston on Contracts (3rd ed.), vol. 2, s.227. The category of voidness would create perils
for innocent third parties if, as may be the case, no property passes under a void agreement.
See McBride v. Appleton [1946] O.R. 17, [1946] 2 D.L.R. 16 (C.A.), per Roach, J.A. For this reason,
among others, the better view is that property does pass. See Stocks v. Wilson, [1913] 2 K.B. 235,
82 L.J. K.B. 598; Watts v. Seymour, [1967] 2 Q.B. 647, [1967] 2 W.L.R. 1072, [1967] 1 All E.R. 1044
(C.A.). And see G. H. Treitel, The Law of Contract (4th ed.) at 384. And see further, the text at
footnote 116 et seq.
2Beam v. Beatty (No. 2); Phillips v. Greater Ottawa Development Co.; Re Staruch; McKay v. McKinley,
supra, footnote 20.
"Beam v. Beatty (No. 2); Phillips v. Greater Ottawa Development Co.; McKay v. McKinley, supra, footnote 20.
"For discussions of these problems, see infra, the text at footnotes 70 to 73.
2If the agreement is void, the adult party need not perform his obligations even though the infant
affirms the contract after attaining majority. The adult party may thus be afforded an unmeritorious
excuse for non-performance never contemplated at the time of formation. See Wright, supra,
footnote 21, at 324.
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Act, 1874.26 The pertinent provisions of that statute were adopted in
only one Canadian jurisdiction, British Columbia. Section 2 of the
British Columbia Infants Act 27 provides:
All contracts, whether by specialty or by simple contract, entered into by
infants for the repayment of money lent or to be lent, or for goods supplied
or to be supplied (other than contracts for necessaries), and all accounts
stated with infants, are absolutely void; but this enactment shall not invalidate
any contract into which an infant may, by any existing or future Statute,
or by the rules of common law or equity, enter, except such as now by law
are voidable.
The Act goes on to provide, as does the English legislation, that no action
shall be brought to enforce ". . . any promise made after full age to pay any
debt contracted during infancy, or upon any ratification made after full
age of any promise or contract made during infancy. ." Although
the precise effect of this legislation is a matter of considerable dispute,29
it is clear that certain types of contracts are rendered "absolutely void 30
by the statute, and, further, that contracts considered voidable at
common law, in the sense of not binding the infant until ratification,
no longer bind the infant upon ratification.
In sum, a complex set of rules determines the question of the enforce-
ability of agreements entered into with minors. To ascertain which of
those rules will apply in a specific case, the transaction must be charac-
terized as belonging to one of the following categories:
(a) agreements of service which are beneficial to the infant
employee, which agreements are binding on both parties;
(b) agreements for the supply of necessaries to the minor;
(c) "voidable" agreements which are binding on both parties
until repudiated;
(d) "voidable" agreements which are not binding on the minor
unless ratified after attaining majority;
(e) agreements which are "void" at common law; and
2037 & 38 Vict., c.62.
'
7 R.S.B.C. 1960, c.193.
"Ibid., s.3.
"See, e.g. G. H. Treitel, The Infants Relief Act, 1874 (1957), 73 L.Q. Rev. 194; P. S. Atiyah, The
Infants Relief Act 1874 - A Reply, (1958), 74 L.Q. Rev. 97; G. H. Treitel, The Infants Relief At, 1874 - A
Short Rebutter, (1958), 74 L.Q. Rev. 104.
3*The consequences of absolute voidness are, however, obscure. As to whether property passes, see
infra, the text at footnote 116 et seq. As to the ability of third parties to rely on the voidness, see the
conflicting authorities on the question of the liability of a guarantor of a void indebtedness of a minor:
Coutts & Co. v. Broume-Lecky, [1947] K.B. 104, [1946] 2 All E.R. 207 (guarantor not liable); First
Charter Financial Corporation Ltd. v. Musclow (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 138 (B.C.S.C.) (dictum, guarantor
liable). As to the ability of the minor to enforce void agreements, see the Treitel-Atiyah debate,
ibid As to the availability of restitutionary remedies, see further, infra, the text at footnotes 73 to 77
and 112 to 144.
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(f) in British Columbia, agreements which are "absolutely void"
within the meaning of the Infants Act.
The task of classification is not an easy matter. The boundaries of each
category are elusive, as indeed, in some cases, are the reasons for drawing
the distinction in the first place. As a result, the categories overlap and
intersect in the reported case law in a somewhat confused fashion.31
Our concern here is to examine the operation of the restitutionary rules
which apply once it has been determined that the agreement is unen-
forceable. In what circumstances may the minor or the other party
recover the value of benefits conferred on the other through perfor-
mance of the unenforceable agreement? The answer to this question
may vary to some extent from one category of unenforceability to the
next. However, before turning to these problems, we here consider
whether the liability of the minor for necessaries is truly contractual or
rests on principles of restitution.
C. THE NATURE OF THE MINOR'S LIABILITY FOR NECESSARIES
It is well established that a minor is obliged to pay the reasonable
value of necessary goods and services which have been supplied.
Whether the minor will be liable on an executory agreement for their
supply will depend on whether the minor's liability is contractual or
restitutionary in nature. On this point there is little guidance in the
case law. Although a majority of the commentators3 2 appear to favour
a restitutionary analysis, the present state of the authorities indicates
that the point should be regarded as unsettled.
With respect to the supply of necessary goods, a strong argument
can be made for the view that the minor is not liable in contract. Modern
English and Canadian authorities addressing this point, however, offer
conflicting dicta. 33 In Nash v. Inman,3 4 for example, Fletcher Moulton
"lSee, generally, Percy, supra, footnote 2, for a useful review of the authorities.
2See, e.g., Wright, supra, footnote 21; -1. D. Payne, The Contractual Liability of Infants, (1966)
5 West. Ont. L. Rev. 136, at 139 et seq; C. H. C. Edwards, Infants' Liability in Contract, in Isaac
Pitblado Lectures (1970), at 8; P. S. Atiyah, Introduction to the Law of Contract (2nd ed.) at 101-102;
G. H. L. Fridman, Sale of Goods in Canada (1973), at 28; Anson's Law of Contract (24th ed.), at 212
et seq.; Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract (9th ed.), at 404 et seq. This is the clearly established
position in American law. See williston, supra, footnote 21, s.240. And see, J. C. Miles, The Infant's
Liability for Necessaries, (1927) 43 L. Q. Rev. 389. See, contra, Goff and Jones, supra, footnote 3, at
309-311; Percy, Supra, footnote 2, at 9; Treitel, supra, footnote 21, at 370-371.
13For Canadian dicta in support of the restitutionary view, see R. v. Rash, supra, footnote 8, at 256,
and Re Oberth and The Hospital Aid Act, [1936] 3 W.W.R. 474 (Man. K.B.), at 476. In support of
the contractual view, see Beam v. Beatty (No. 2), supra, footnote 20, at 559, and Soon and Soon v.
Watson et al (1962), 38 W.W.R. 503 (B.C.S.C.), at 505.
34[1908] 2 K.B. 1 (C.A.), at 8, 77 L.J. K.B. 626, at 631. See also, Guardians of Pontypridd Union v.
Drew, [1927] 1 K.B. 214 (C.A.), at 220, 95 L.J. K.B. 1030 at 1034, per Scrutton L.J.
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L.J. suggested that the obligation to pay a fair price for necessaries is
imposed on the infant by law despite his contractual incapacity. In the
same case, Buckley L.J. said that, "The plaintiff, when he sues the
defendant for goods supplied during infancy, is suing him in contract on
the footing that the contract was such as the infant, notwithstanding
infancy, could make. 3 5 The liability actually imposed on the infant,
however, appears to be restitutionary. Canadian sale of goods legislation
is patterned on section 2 of the English Sale of Goods Act, 36 which
provides as follows:
Capacity to buy and sell is regulated by the general law concerning capacity
to contract, and to transfer and acquire property. Provided that where
necessaries are sold and delivered to an infant, or minor, or to a person who
by reason of mental incapacity or drunkenness is incompetent to contract, he
must pay a reasonable price therefor.
Liability for necessary goods does not attach, then, until they have been
actually delivered. Indeed, it is not possible to reach a definite conclusion
as to whether the goods are necessaries until the time of delivery, for
the legislation defines "necessaries" as, "goods suitable to the condition
in life of such infant or minor... and to his actual requirements at the time
of the sale and delivery."' 37 The price to be paid must be a reasonable
one, independently of any agreement reached by the parties, though
the infant would be entitled to enforce an advantageous price term
since such agreements are, at the option of the minor, binding on the
adult party.
In the context of necessary services, an English case, Roberts v.
Gray, 3 8 suggests that an executory contract for the provision of necessary
services is binding on the infant, and thus supports the view that the
minor's liability for necessaries is contractual. It is difficult, however, to
fashion a rationale for holding the infant to executory commitments
of this kind. Indeed, Roberts v. Gray itself illustrates the unsatisfactory
nature of the proposition. 9 In that case, Gray, an infant, having
determined that he wished to become a professional billiards player,
agreed to accompany the plaintiff, Roberts, a well-established professional,
on a tour. The infant was to receive instruction from Roberts and was
to be employed by him during the tour. Roberts expended certain
moneys in preparation for the tour, whereupon Gray resiled from his
undertaking. Roberts claimed for damages for breach of contract and
was awarded £1,500. An appeal taken by Gray was dismissed. The
ssNash v. Inman, ibid&, at K.B. 12, L.J.K.B. 633.
"656 & 57 Vict., c. 71, s.2.
"Jbid, s.2 [emphasis added].
1[19 13] I K.B. 520, 82 LJ. K.B. 362 (C.A.).
39'rhe Latey Committee tersely remarked that they, "would not wish to see this case followed."
See The Ldtaq Report, supra, footnote 7. s.314.
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Court ot Appeal treated the claim as arising from a contract for the
supply of necessary services in the form of instruction, and held that
as such, it was binding on the infant, even though still executory.
Although a number of grounds for distinguishing Roberts v. Gray have
been suggested by those who favour a restitutionary approach to these
problems,40 its effect, at the very least, is to place the matter in some doubt.
In the face of this uncertainty, a return to basic considerations
underlying the rules relating to minors' contractual incapacity is appropri-
ate. The predominant theme struck in the case law is the desirability
of granting the infant an option to withdraw from undertakings which
he has come to regret. The merits of this policy may be enhanced by the
recent reductions of the age of majority in Canadian jurisdictions4 '
which have brought the attainment of majority much closer to what is, in
practical terms, the school-leaving age for most infants. Moreover,
there do not appear to be compelling considerations in favour of holding
the infant liable for damages on an executory agreement. One might
argue that the imposition of contractual liability would have the effect
of encouraging suppliers of necessaries to deal with minors. Yet, as the
Latey Committee pointed out,4 2 there is little evidence to suggest that the
elusive distinction between necessaries and non-necessaries plays any part
in the judgment exercised by a retailer who decides to enter into an agree-
ment with an infant.43 It may be that the apparent reluctance of the English
courts to confirm the restitutionary nature of the liability of minors
for necessaries is better explained, as Dean Wright has argued, 44 as
being linked to their general reluctance to acknowledge the validity of a
theory of restitutionary liability which is distinct from contract and tort.
If this is correct, further support for a restitutionary analysis of the
minors' liability in Canadian law may be drawn from the rejection of the
"implied contract" rationale of restitutionary relief effected by the Supreme
Court of Canada in the Deglman case.45
Regardless of the ultimate disposition of this issue, it is clear that
once the adult party has relied on the agreement by supplying necessary
goods or services, the minor is liable for their reasonable value, or, in
cases where the minor affirms the contract in order to enforce an
advantageous price term, such lesser amount as has been agreed to by
the supplier.
"
0See, e.g., Cheshire and Fifoot, supra, footnote 32, at 406.
4 See supra, footnote I.
4 The Latey Report, supra, footnote 7, s.318.
"The vagaries of this distinction are explored by Percy, supra, footnote 2, at 2-6.
4 Wright, supra, footnote 21, at 321.
4 Supra, footnote 5.
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D. RESTITUTION OF BENEFITS CONFERRED UNDER
UNENFORCEABLE AGREEMENTS
The case law concerning restitutionary claims for benefits conferred
under agreements unenforceable for infancy exhibits characteristics
commonly observed elsewhere in the restitutionary case law. 46 Some of
the leading English authorities have relied heavily on the "implied
contract" theory of restitutionary liability in rejecting claims of this nature.
Canadian courts in recent years have departed from a strict application
of the rules developed by the English courts and have demonstrated a
greater willingness to order restitution of benefits conferred. Two
different categories of claims are to be considered; claims brought by
the minor, and claims brought by the other party. Each of these categories
will be further subdivided in terms of the various enforceability types
described above.
1. Claims by Minor
(i) Voidable Agreements: Two distinct and conflicting lines of authority
have developed in Canadian and English case law dealing with the
recovery of benefits conferred by minors under agreements which are
voidable on the ground of infancy, either in the sense of being unenforce-
able until ratified or in the sense of being binding until repudiated.
In a number of cases the minor has been held entitled to restitution of
the benefit conferred provided that a restitutio in integrum of the adult
party can be made. The alternative rule to be found in the authorities
is that the minor is entitled to restitution only if he has sustained a total
failure of consideration. This latter rule is more restrictive, in the sense
that it severely limits the range of situations in which the minor can
obtain restitution. These two approaches are considered in turn,
beginning with the former as it appears to be more consistent with the
underlying policy of enabling a minor to avoid a depletion of his own
assets through the performance of rashly given or improvident under-
takings. Moreover, it is an approach which has been more widely applied
in Canada than in England. 47
The use of the phrase, restitutio in integrum, suggests an equitable
origin for this doctrine and it is indeed clear that the doctrine will
apply where equitable relief, such as the setting aside of a deed, is
"See, e.g. McCamus, supra, footnote 3.
4"It has been suggested that, in English law at least, the total failure of consideration requirement
applies to money claims whereas the duty to make restitutio in integrum will apply where a minor
claims for the restoration of property. See Cheshire and Fifoot, supra, footnote 32, at 411-413.
This would not be a satisfactory statement of the position in Canadian law, however, for a number
of reasons: (a) the modern Canadian cases cannot in fact be reconciled on this basis; (b) the Canadian
courts have not explicitly adopted such a rationalization of the case law; and (c) such a distinction
has little to commend itself either in terms of logic or underlying policy.
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required. In the Ontario case of Whalls v. Learn, 4 for example, a young
woman sought to recover land which she had conveyed as a minor to the
defendants in return for a sum of money and the conveyance to her of
other lands owned by the defendant. The plaintiff could not succeed,
according to Chancellor Boyd, "... without making complete restoration
to the defendants of the specific, or an equivalent, value of that which
she has received from the defendants."49 In the result, the plaintiff
was obliged to restore all benefits conferred by the defendants as a pre-
condition of her own restitutionary relief. It should be emphasized
that restitution need not be made in specie. The courts exercise a broad
discretion to award monetary equivalents for benefits which cannot be
specifically restored. In Murray v. Dean,5 another Ontario case involving
rescission of an agreement to exchange properties, the plaintiff, a minor,
was obliged to pay the defendant for the value of certain benefits derived
from his occupation of the defendant's land. As well, the plaintiff was
obliged to pay the defendant for the value of certain improvements
which the defendant had made to the plaintiffs property.
Canadian courts have not restricted the application of this rule to
cases involving equitable relief in the full sense, but have applied it
in the context of claims to recover money paid,5 a and presumably, it
could be extended to claims for the value of goods or services supplied
as well. 52 Thus, in Sturgeon v. Starr5", Prendergast J. of the Manitoba
Supreme Court denied a minor's claim for recovery of purchase moneys
paid to the defendant for certain chattels on the ground that the
defendant, in the rather peculiar circumstances of that case, could not be
restored to his former position. The following statement of Prendergast J.
has been relied on in subsequent Canadian cases:5 4
... if an infant pay money without valuable consideration, he can get it
back; and if he pay money for valuable consideration, he may also recover it;
but subject to the condition that he can restore the other party to his former
position. 5s
4 Supra, footnote 12. See also, Phillips v. Sutherland (1910), 15 W.L.R. 594 (Man. K.B.). And see,
Butterfield v. Sibbitt and Nipissing Electric Supply Company Ltd., supra, footnote 20.
4'Whalls v. Learn, supra, footnote 12, at 487.
5tSupra, footnote 18.
"
tSturgeon v. Starr (1911), 17 W.L.R. 402 (Man. K.B.); Lafayette v. W. W. Distributors and Co. Ltd.
(1965), 51 W.W.R. 685 (Sask. Dist. C.); Bo-Lassen v.Josiassen, [1973] 4 W.W.R. 317 (Alta. Dist. C.).
And see Nicklin v. Longhurst (1917), 27 Man. R. 255, [1917] 1 W.W.R. 439 (C.A.).
"Although there is no Canadian authority on point, there is no reason in principle to treat these
cases differently. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Grow (1923), 247 Mass. 133, 141 N.E. 859.
5 Supra, footnote 51.
4Lafayette v. W. W. Distributors and Co. Ltd., and Bo-Lassen v. Josiassen, supra, footnote 51.
$sSturgeon v. Starr, supra, footnote 51, at 404.
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In a more recent Alberta case, Bo-Lassen v. Josiassen,56 Buchanan J.
drew support for these remarks from early English authorities 57 and went
on to allow recovery of purchase moneys paid by a minor for a motor-
cycle, on the condition that the plaintiff restore the motorcycle to the
defendant vendor. In the event that there had been interim enjoyment of
the goods, the court could, it is suggested, rely by analogy on the land
cases 58 and deduct from the award an amount representing the value
to the minor of such use of the goods.
A number of issues remain to be resolved by the courts. It is not
clear, for example, to what extent restitutio in integrum might be treated
not only as a condition of obtaining restitutionary relief, but as a condition
of avoiding the agreement in the first place. This issue is considered
further in reviewing the general question of the rights of the other
party to obtain restitution from the minor.5 9
A second question which remains open is whether Canadian courts,
following the restitutio in integrum line of authority, would exercise,
as do the American courts, a discretion to waive the requirement of full
restitution to the other party as a precondition of restitutionary relief
for the minor in cases where a strict application of the rule would cause
undue hardship to the minor. This might be appropriate where the
benefit obtained by the minor has deteriorated in value or has been lost,
parted with, or otherwise consumed. In some American cases, for example,
minors have been permitted to avoid contracts for the purchase of auto-
mobiles and recover the amount paid toward the purchase price upon
returning the vehicle in damaged condition.6 1 In the absence of over-
reaching by the other party or severe prejudice to the minor, resulting, for
example, from his impecuniosity, such a rule may be unduly prejudicial
to the interests of the adult.6 "
"Supra, footnote 51.
"'Holrmes v. Blogg (1818), 8 Taunt. 508, 129 E.R. 481; Corpe v. Overton (1833), 10 Bing. 252, 131 E.R.
901, 3 LJ. C.P. 24.
SWhalls v. Learn, supra, footnote 12; Murray v. Dean, supra, footnote 18.
"See, infra, the text at footnotes 78 to 105.
"This is the majority rule in American jurisdictions. See, e.g., Quality Motors Inc. v. Hays (1949),
216 Ark. 264, 225 S.W. 2d 326; Hines v. Cheshire (1950), 36 Wash. 2d 467, 219 P. 2d 100;
Fisher v. Taylor Motor Co. (1959), 249 N.C. 617, 107 S.E. 2d 94; Bowling v. Sperry (1962), 133 Ind. App.
692, 184 N.E. 2d 901. There are a number of jurisdictions in which the infant seeking recovery is
obliged to restore the value of benefits received. In others, legislation requiring infants over the age
of eighteen years to make full restitution has been enacted. See, generally, Annot., Infant's Liability
for Use or Depreciation of Subject Matter, in Action to Recover Purchase Price Upon His Disoffirmance of
Contract to Purchase Goods (1967), 12 A.L.R. 3d 1174. It is a different question, of course, whether
the minor who seeks merely to repudiate may be excused from making a full restitutio in integruam
For authorities suggesting that he may be so excused, see infra, the text at footnote 88 et seq.
"See Williston, supra, footnote 21, s.238.
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Although some support for the restitutio in integrum rule can be found
in the English cases, 62 the generally accepted view in England is that
the infant cannot recover the value of benefits conferred unless there has
been a total failure of consideration.6 3 This approach has also been taken
in a number of Canadian cases in which claims have been brought by
infants to recover benefits conferred under voidable agreements. Thus,
infant purchasers have been denied recovery of money paid over to the
vendor, whether by way of a deposit or as a full or partial payment of
the purchase price. This rule has been applied in cases of agreements
which are voidable in the sense of being binding until repudiated, such as
agreements for the purchase of land, 4 and with respect to agreements
which are voidable in the sense of not being binding until ratified, such
as agreements to purchase non-necessary goods,6 5 on the basis that some
interim enjoyment of the benefits of ownership had already occurred.
The historical explanation for this doctrine would appear to be that the
claims in question are claims for the recovery of money had and
received, and as such were thought to be subject to the total failure of
consideration requirement which was recognized as a necessary element of
quasi-contractual money claims in other contexts.6 6 Whether this doctrine
retains a contemporary vitality, or has now been superseded by the
restitutio in integrum analysis, must be considered for the present an
arguable point. It is suggested, however, that a review of the merits of
these competing doctrines indicates that preference should be given to the
latter.
As has already been indicated, the restitutio in integrum analysis seems
more consistent with the underlying policy of permitting the infant to
resile from disadvantageous bargains. The fact that the infant has enjoyed
"See, e.g., Valentini v. Canali (1889), 24 Q.B.D. 166, 59 L.J. Q.B. 74, where a contract 'was held
"absolutely void" under the Infants Relief Act, 1874, and the infant was denied recovery because,
according to Lord Coleridge C.J., at 167 (Q.B.D.), 76 (L.J. Q.B.), he "could not give back... [the]
benefit or replace the detendant in the position in whtch he was betore the contract." And see the
discussion of the earlier English authorities in Bo-Lassen v. Jsiassen, supra, footnote 51. See also,
Treitel, supra, footnote 29, at 202-205; Atiyah, supra, footnote 29, at 101-103; Goff and Jones,
supra, footnote 3, at 312.
"Steinberg v. Scala (Leeds) Ltd., [1923] 2 Ch. 452, 92 L.J. K.B. 944 (C.A.), and Pearce v. Brain,
[1929] 2 K.B. 310, 98 L.J. K.B. 559 (contract "absolutely void" under the Infants Relief Act, 1874.
See also, dicta in Chaplin v. Leslie Frewin (Publishers) Ltd., (1966] Ch. 71, (1966] 2 W.L.R. 40,
[1965] 3 All E.R. 764, criticized by Cheshire and Fifoot, supra, footnote 32, at 413. It may be that
this rule will be applied to claims to recover money contributed to a partnership by a minor.
See Exparte Taylor (1856), 8 De G. M. & G. 254, 44 E.R. 388, 25 L.J. Bk. 35, denying a minor the right to
recover premium paid on entering a partnership. Sed quaere. The American rule allows recovery
subject to a deduction for amounts received from the partnership. See Williston, supra, footnote 21,
s.229. Presumably, this rule would be applied in Canada, relying by analogy on the cases dealing
with recovery of land.
4Short v. Field (1914), 32 O.L.R. 395 (C.A.); Robinson v. Moffat (1916), 35 O.L.R. 9 (C.A.).
SMcDonald v. Baxter (1911), 46 N.S.R. 149, 9 E.L.R. 316 (S.C.); Coul/ v. Kolbuc (1969), 68 W.W.R.
76 (Alta. Dist. Ct.), Fannon v. Dobranski (1970), 73 W.W.R. 371 (Alta. Dist. Ct.).
"
6See, e.g., Earl of Buckinghamshire v. Drury (1761), 2 Eden 60, at 72, 28 E.R. 818, at 823, per Lord
Mansfield.
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a modest benefit under the agreement does not seem to be sufficient
reason for saddling him with the full measure of his folly. At the same
time, it may be quite appropriate to protect the interests of the adult by
deducting the value of the benefit received from the amount to be
recovered by the infant. By requiring restoration of the status quo ante
in this way, the restitutio in integrum analysis is capable of accommodating
the legitimate interests of both parties to the transaction. The total
failure of consideration analysis, on the other hand, dictates an all-or-
nothing approach. Indeed, the restrictiveness of this doctrine has led to
the development of two rather strained interpretations of the total failure
requirement which have the effect of allowing restitutionary relief to the
infant even though some consideration has already passed. First, in some
cases the courts have restated the requirement in a more open-textured
fashion, asking whether the infant has derived a real advantage from the
consideration passed, and have granted the infant recovery of money paid
even though the adult had already performed part of the bargain.6 1
In other cases, however, the requirement has been given a very strict
reading indeed. In a recent Alberta case, Fannon v. Dobranski,6 8 an
infant purchaser, who drove his new car for some seventy miles, was
held unable to resile from the transaction and recover the price or any
portion thereof. A second method of narrowing the operation of the
doctrine is illustrated by a nineteenth-century English case, Everett v.
Wilkins.6 9 There, the infant plaintiff had agreed to purchase a one-half
share of the defendant's business, the operation of a public house. Part of
the price was to be paid immediately, the rest at a future point in time.
The defendant was to furnish the plaintiff and his wife with board and
lodging in the public house and, upon payment of the final instalment
of the price, to share with him the proceeds of the partnership. After
paying the first instalment, moving into the public house, and sharing in
the management of the business, the plaintiff purported to repudiate
the transaction and sued to recover the amount of the first instalment
as money had and received. The claim was successful. The infant was
awarded the amount paid less an adjustment to reflect the value of the
board and lodging which had already been consumed by the plaintiff
and his wife. The obligation to supply board and lodging was said to be
merely collateral; there had been a total failure of consideration on the
main obligation and the restitutionary action would lie. A more straight-
forward method of achieving such a result is offered by the Canadian
authorities which have adopted the restitutio in integrum analysis.
(ii) Agreements Void at Common Law: Where the agreement is void at
common law, some support may be found in the Canadian authorities for
"See, e.g. Hamilton v. Vaughan-Sherrin Electrical Engineenng Co., (1894] 3 Ch. 589, 63 L.J. Ch. 795,
criticized on this point in Steinberg v. Scala (Leeds) Ltd., supra, footnote 63 and in Phillips v.
Greater Ottawa Development Co., supra, footnote 20. Cf Rowland v. Divall, [1923] 2 K.B. 500, 92
L.J. K.B. 1041 (C.A.).
"Supra, footnote 65.
49(1874), 29 L.T.R. 846 (Ex.).
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the view that the minor is allowed to recover benefits transferred to the
adult, or their value, whether or not the minor has enjoyed benefits
furnished by the adult and whether or not a restoration of the status quo
ante is possible. 70 It has been questioned, however, whether a rule so
favourable to the minor's position is desirable.7 1 In the absence of
evidence of an intention to exploit the inexperience of the minor, it
would seem to be appropriate to afford restitutionary protection to the
adult by deducting from the award made to the infant a sum reflecting
the value of benefits received. This could be accomplished simply by
applying a restitutio in integrum analysis in such cases. 72 An alternative,
and for the reasons indicated above, a less satisfactory approach, would
be to impose the total failure of consideration requirement as a pre-
requisite to restitutionary relief.7 3
(iii) Agreements "Absolutely Void" by Statute: The availability of resti-
tutionary relief to minors who have conferred benefits under agreements
rendered "absolutely void" by the British Columbia Infants Act is a matter
yet to be considered by a Canadian court. Nor is any guidance given
by the statute itself. Since the underlying considerations of social policy
are identical to those present in the cases dealing with agreements which
are voidable at common law, it is suggested that the preferable view
is that the minor be allowed to recover the value of benefits conferred
on the adult party, provided that a restitutio in integrum of the adult party
can be effected - whether by a return of the benefit received in specie
or by a reduction in the amount of the award to reflect the value of any
benefit which has already been received by the infant plaintiff.74 It may
be, however, that the English cases dealing with agreements nullified by
a similar statutory provision and which suggest, though not unequivoc-
ally,7 5 that recovery of money76 or chattels7 7 is contingent upon a showing
of a total failure of consideration, would be considered to be persuasive
by a Canadian court confronted with this issue.
"Re Staruch and Upper v. Lightning Fastener Employees' Credit Union (St. Catharines) Limited, supra,
footnote 20.
"Percy, supra, footnote 2, at 35.
"Support for this approach may be drawn from Butteifield v. Sibbitt and Nipissing Electric Supply
Company Limited, supra, footnote 20. There, the infant plaintiffs release of a cause of action against
the defendant was held void. The plaintiff was allowed to recover on the original cause of action
subject to a deduction for the amount of the payment given for the release.
"3For dicta supporting this approach, see Phillips v. Greater Ottawa Development Co., supra, footnote 20,
and Altobelli v. Wilson, supra, footnote 20.
"
4Supra, the text at footnotes 50 to 58.
"supra, footnote 62.
"Valentini v. Canali, supra, footnote 62.
"Pearce v. Brain, supra, footnote 63.
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2. Claims By The Other Party
Apart from cases involving the supply of necessaries, 78 restitutionary
protection is afforded to the other party to some degree by two different
means. First, in some situations a duty is imposed on the minor to make
restitution - the extent of which is not established with certainty - either
as a condition of being permitted to avoid the agreement or as a condition
of being permitted to pursue his own restitutionary remedies. 9 Second,
the other party has been permitted in some circumstances to assert an
affirmative restitutionary claim against the minor. The law relating to both
of these matters is in a very unsettled state; the law relating to claims
brought by the minor may by comparison appear to be remarkably well
ordered.
There are a number of reasons for the more fluid state of the law
relating to the rights of the other party. In addition to the conflicting
approaches of the restitutio in integrum rules - as against the total failure
of consideration rules - we are here confronted by a much more
delicately balanced policy issue. Whereas it is easily seen that restitutionary
relief for the minor is quite consistent with the policy underlying the
incapacity doctrine, it is more difficult to discern the correct position
with respect to claims by the other party. Would the granting of in
personam restitutionary relief to the other party subvert the policy of
protecting minors from their inexperience? Or, may there not be circum-
stances where a restoration of the status quo ante would effect substantial
justice for both parties? Further, the question of the relevance of English
case law raises complex considerations in this area. The development
of common law restitutionary principles in English law has been hindered
by judicial reliance on the implied contract theory. For this reason,
among others, there has been a tendency in English writing on the subject
to seek a basis for restitutionary recovery in expanded notions of
proprietary relief and in equitable claims against the minor based on a
broadly construed doctrine of fraud. It may be, of course, that the
demise of the implied contract theory in Canadian restitutionary law,
when coupled with the fact that most of the modern English cases have
been decided in the shadow of legislation80 which has been adopted in
only one Canadian jurisdiction,"' provides a sound basis for suggesting
that this English common law malady, and its equitable cure, need not
be considered a part of Canadian law. At the same time it would be
unwise to ignore the English jurisprudence in such an area as this where
the Canadian doctrine exhibits much instability. Thus, in the following
discussion, while emphasis is given to the approach taken in the Canadian
"
8Supra, text at footnotes 32 to 45.
7 This latter aspect has been considered in detail in the preceding section and therefore need be
considered only very briefly in this context.
"'The Infants ReliefAct (1874), 37 & 38 Vict., c.62.
"British Columbia. See the Infants Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c.193.
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material, reference is also made to the English material where it appears to
provide either additional remedial doctrines or alternative models of
analysis. We return, then, to a consideration of the various categories of
enforceability with a view to ascertaining the restitutionary rights of the
other party to the agreement.
(i) Voidable Agreements: If the agreement in question is one which is
voidable in the sense of being binding until repudiated by the minor, the
act of repudiation will revest in the original owner property transferred
under the agreement. 2 Additionally, where the minor is seeking the
restoration of the property transferred, he will be required to repay the
value of benefits he has received, whether through use of the other
party's property or otherwise. 83  Whether this duty to make a full
restitutio in integrum would be imposed more generally on the minor as a
condition of disaffirming such an agreement is doubtful.14
There is some authority for the view that a minor will be permitted
to recover moneys paid to the other party only if he can establish
failure of consideration.8 5  Paradoxically, this would go well beyond
restitutionary protection of the other party; it would permit him to profit
from the unenforceable agreement, perhaps handsomely and unex-
pectedly, by retaining benefits conferred by the minor without being
required to account for their value. It is argued here that preference
ought to be given to a conflicting line of authority which would permit
the minor to succeed in a restitutionary claim only if he can make
restitution to the other party.88
If the agreement is voidable in the sense of being not binding until
ratified, the minor who avoids the agreement and seeks restoration of
benefits conferred may be required to make a full restitutio in integrum
to the other party.8 Where the minor is not actively seeking restitution
the other party's position is less secure. Since the agreement is not
binding on the minor ab initio, it is theoretically not necessary for him
to come forward and repudiate the agreement to escape his obligations.
Further, property in any goods supplied will pass to the minor under the
81Williams on Vendor and Purchaser (4th ed.), at 847, and Goff and Jones, supra, footnote 3, at 313.
"
5See, e.g., Whalls v. Learn, supra, footnote 12, and Murray v. Dean, supra, footnote 18. See also,
supra, text at footnote 48 et seq.
4Some Canadian courts, dealing with contracts which are generally classified as not binding until
ratified, have suggested that such a duty is to be imposed as a condition of disaffirmance. See
infra, footnote 90. See also, Lempri~re v. Lange (1879), 12 Ch. D. 675, 41 L.T.R. 378 (C.A.).
"
5 Short v. Field and Robinson v. Moffat, supra, footnote 64.
SSupra, the text at footnote 47 et seq.
8,/bid.
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agreement."" Hence, a minor who purchases non-necessary goods, for
example, may take delivery, refuse to pay, and await suit. If, in the face
of the minor's refusal to pay, the other party demands a return of the
goods supplied, there is authority for the view that this will have the
effect of revesting property in the supplier and will provide a basis for an
action in detinue. 8 Alternatively, the other party may bring an action to
enforce the agreement. The court may in such circumstances afford
restitutionary protection to the other party by requiring the minor to
make restitution to some extent as a condition of being permitted to
raise the defence of minority. Some Canadian cases suggest that a
voidable contract can only be avoided if the minor returns the property
he has received "or its value.90 These statements have been criticized
by one judge of the Ontario High Court' as being "too broad," and
indeed, a strict rule requiring full restitution by the minor as a condition
of avoidance could do much to undermine the protection afforded
minors by the unenforceability rules. It is clear, however, that, at the
very least, the minor can be called upon to restore whatever remains
in specie of the benefit received.9 2  Further, where the benefit has
deteriorated in value, or has been lost, wasted, consumed or otherwise
disposed of after attaining the age of majority, the former minor may be
required to pay the remaining value of the benefit as of the time of his
reaching majority.93 Thus, in an Ontario case, Louden Manufacturing
"The other party is under a binding obligation to pass property. Property in goods supplied by the
minor would pass as well. See, e.g., McGaw v. Fisk (1908), 38 N.B.R. 354 (C.A.); Chaplin v.
Leslie Frewin (Publishers) Ld, supra, footnote 63. Cf the question of property passage under
absolutely void agreements discussed infra, at footnote 116 et seq.
"McGaw v. Fisk, ibid. The difficulty with this position is that it may run afoul of the rule that actions
in tort cannot be employed as a means of indirect enforcement of the minor's undertaking.
See, e.g., Ballett v. Mingay, [1943] 1 K.B. 281, [1943] 1 All E.R. 143 (C.A.) (detinue sustained
against a minor in breach of the terms of bailment because on these facts the tortious conduct is
independent of or outside the contract). We agree, however, with those writers who have suggested
that detinue should generally be permitted since the thrust of the action is not to enforce the
agreement but to effect a restoration of the status quo ante. See Payne, supra, footnote 32, at 150,
and P. S. Atiyah, The Liability ofInfants in Fraud and Restitution (1959), 22 Mod. L. Rev. 273, at 281.
9"Re Hutton Estate et aL, [1926] 3 W.W.R. 609, at 611, [1926] 4 D.L.R. 1080 (Alta. S.C.) at 1082-1083.
And see Blackwell v. Farrow, [1948] O.W.N. 7 (H.C.).
"Butterfield v. Sibbitt and Nipissing Electric Supply Company Limited, supra, footnote 20, at 510, per
Ferguson J.
"Louden Manufacturing Co. v. Milmine (1907), 14 O.L.R. 532, aff'd 15 O.L.R. 53 (D.C.);
Butterfield v. Sibbitt and Nipissing Electric Supply Limited, supra, footnote 20; Noble's Ltd v. Bellefleur
(1963), 37 D.L.R. (2d) 519 (N.B.C.A.), relying on Williston, supra, footnote 21, s.238, and 31
Corpus Juris, at 1070-1071. The cases do not clearly establish whether the duty imposed here is
in rem on the theory, presumably, that property has revested in the plaintiff. If it is, it would
appear that the duty does not extend to cover the case of a resale or barter which occurs prior
to the plaintiffs attempt to revest property in himself. Property in the original goods having passed
to the minor by this point, the plaintiff would have no proprietary right to assert against the minor
and therefore could not trace at common law into the proceeds or substitute goods. As to the
potential relevance of equitable tracing rules, see infra, footnotes 96 and 127. See also, Atiyah,
supra, footnote 89, at 290.
"Louden Manufacturing Co. v. Milmine, ibid; Great West Implement Co. v. Grams (1908), 8 W.L.R. 160
(Alta. C.A.); Molyneux v. Trail, supra, footnote 8; Noble's Ltd. v. Bellefleur, ibid.
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Company v. Milmine, 94 a defendant, who had purchased non-necessary
goods as a minor, was held liable to pay to the seller the value of that
portion of the goods which he had retained at majority and subsequently
resold to a third party. This rule also applies to money paid to the
minor and retained at majority. 95
Application of these various strands of Canadian case law to the
question of the rights of a lender who has advanced money to an infant
borrower poses similar problems. Presumably, to the extent that the
moneys remain traceable,9" a duty to restore them to the lender would
be imposed. 97 To the extent that the moneys advanced have been spent
by the minor on necessaries9" or on the purchase of land99 the lender
would be permitted to obtain restitution on the basis of the doctrine of
subrogation. Whether a duty to make full restitution would be imposed
in the absence of these factors is another matter. If the contract of loan
were harsh and oppressive, and so held to be void rather than merely
voidable, it seems very likely that the minor would not be burdened with a
general duty to make full in personam restitution.10 0 If the contract of
borrowing were merely voidable, however, reliance might be placed on
those Canadian authorities which suggest that the minor must make a full
restitutio in integrum as a condition of avoiding the agreement.1 01  At the
least, it would appear that the lender is entitled to claim for such of the
moneys advanced as were retained at majority.1 0 2
In sum, then, the Canadian case law in this context again suggests
two alternative and conflicting rules. A duty to make full in personam
restitution is suggested by some cases. Other cases suggest that the
minor can only be called upon to restore benefits retained in specie
94Supra, footnote 92.
O'Molyneux v. Trail, supra, footnote 8. The deffi-dant was an infant seller who had improperly
retained a deposit paid by the plaintiff purchase lrhe court held that recovery of the amount of
the deposit was warranted on the authority of L6n Manufacturing Co. v. Milrine. There was no
evidence to show that the moneys paid over by the plaintiff were traceable in the defendant's hands.
"There appears to be no Canadian authority on point. To the extent that the funds are
traceable at law, recovery is supported by the authorities referred to, supra, footnotes 89 and 92.
The recoverability of funds traceable only in equity will turn on the extent to which Canadian
courts are willing to depart from the requirement of English law that there be a fiduciary relationship
between the parties, or to "find" a fiduciary relationship present in these situations (see infra,
footnote 127.
9
"Relying, by analogy, on Molyneux v. TraiUl, supra, footnote 8.
9"Marlow v. Pitfield (1719), 1 P Wins. 558, 24 E.R. 516; Ghoss v. Munsen (1865), 12 Gr. 77 (Ont.); Lewis v.
A/leyne (1888), 4 T.L.R. 560, 32 SJ. 486 (C.A.).
9"Nottingham Permanent Benefa Building Society v. Thurstan, supra, footnote II (H.L.) (lender subrogated
to vendor's lien).
10*Supra, the text at footnotes 70 to 73.
"'OSupra, the text at footnote 47 et seq.
""Molyneux v. Trail, supra, footnote 8 (money paid as a deposit held recoverable). And see the
authorities cited, supra, footnote 93.
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during his minority, but can be compelled to make full in personam
restitution of benefits retained at majority, whether or not they have
deteriorated or have been disposed of by the time of the action. Although
the weight of authority may be said to favour the latter approach, the
matter has not been the subject of a clear pronouncement by a Canadian
court of high authority and may be regarded as open.
A rather different approach has been taken by the English courts,
though, again, the task of ascertaining the present position is a daunting
one. Since the modern English law has been rendered in the context of
agreements "absolutely void" under the Infants' Relief Act, the problems are
canvassed below with reference to that category of unenforceability.1
0 3
It is sufficient for the present to note that where the agreement has been
induced by fraud" °4 on the part of the minor, an equitable duty to make
restitution has been imposed on the minor. This may provide an additional
avenue of relief for the other party.'"°
(ii) Agreements Void at Common Law: The question of the other party's
ability to obtain restitution of benefits conferred under agreements void at
common law has not been directly addressed in the Canadian case law.
With regard to money borrowed by the minor, however, the lender would
be granted restitution with regard to moneys used by the minor to purchase
land or necessaries on the basis of the doctrine of subrogation. 0 6
Further, it is arguable that the minor is subject to a duty to restore
identifiable money or goods retained by the minor either upon the occasion
of a suit brought by the other party to enforce the contract during
his minority10 7 or upon attaining majority.' Again, the English doc-
trines based on fraudulent conduct by the minor may afford relief' 0 9
'Infra, the text at footnotes 115 to 144.
'The proper definition of the term in this context is a question of some nicety. See infra, the
text at footnotes 128 to 140.
'Although it appears that the Canadian case law considered in the text would extend recovery
in all situations covered by the English fraud doctrines, regardless of whether or:not fraud in the
requisite sense can be established, the unsettled nature of the Canadian authorities suggests that
counsel for the other party may do well to maintain a few English strings for his bow. Cf
Percy, supra, footnote 2, at 43.
1°6Supra, footnotes 98 and 99.
1
0
7By analogy to the case law on voidable agreements; see supra, footnotes 92, 96 and 97.
Alternatively, it is arguable that proprietary relief is available on the theory that property would
revest in the other party upon a demand for its return. See discussion, supra, footnote 89.
A further alternative would be to place proprietary relief on the basis that property would not pass
at all under a contract void at common law. Indeed, it appears to have been assumed by Roach
J. dissenting in McBride v. Appleton, supra, footnote 21, that property would not pass. The
contrary view is, however, preferable, both on authority (see infra, footnote 116) and on principle
(see, infra, the text at footnotes 141 to 142).
"'Additionally, there would be a duty to account for deterioration, loss or other disposition of the
goods occurring after majority has been attained; see discussion supra, footnote 93.
'°
5 Infra, the text at footnotes 128 to 140.
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Beyond this it is doubtful that a general duty to make restitution
would be imposed. Certainly, it has been held in some cases that the
minor can seek restitution even though he can no longer effect a
restztuto in integrum of the other party.1 Further, in situations where
the contract is held void because it is harsh and oppressive it may be
reasonable to deprive the other party of the protection of the unjust
enrichment principle, in order to provide a disincentive for those who
would take advantage of the immaturity and inexperience of a minor. In
the absence of evidence of such oppression, it is arguable that restitutionary
duties could be imposed on the minor to the same extent as if the
contract were considered merely voidable."'
(iii) Agreements "Absolutely Void" by Statute: The British Columbia
Infants Act' 1 2 is silent on the question of whether benefits conferred
by the other party under an agreement rendered "absolutely void" by
its provisions are recoverable. Moreover, the question has not been
considered by a Canadian court. As a matter of general principle, it
might be suggested that the underlying considerations of policy are
identical to those present in the case of an agreement which is voidable
at common law. 1 1 3 Inasmuch as the statute does not indicate an intention
to diminish the restitutionary rights of the other party, it is arguable
that the remedies available to the other party under Canadian law dealing
with voidable agreements should be available in this context as well."14
In the absence of Canadian authority directly on point, however,
it is likely that our courts would seek guidance from the English case
law considering agreements rendered "absolutely void" by the Infants'
Relief Act, 1874.5 It is therefore necessary to review the English position
in some detail, even though the modern English cases in this area are
inconsistent with the principles of Canadian restitutionary law. First
considered are the rights of the other party at common law, and then
under doctrines of equity.
The common law remedies available to the other party are, in the
absence of tortious conduct on the minor's part, virtually non-existent.
It appears to be accepted that property in goods will pass to the minor
"'Re Staruch, and Upper v. Lightning Fastener Employees' Credit Union (St. Catharines) Limited, supra,
footnote 20. Cf Butterfield v. Sibbitt and Nipissing Electric Supply Company Limited, supra, footnote 20.
"'See, generally, Percy, supra, footnote 2, at 32 et seq.
'"R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 193.
"'Many of the transactions rendered void by the statutory provision would be held voidable at
common law.
Supra, the text at footnote 82 et seq.
"'137 & 38 Vic., c.62.
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and, hence, that' proprietary remedies are precluded, 1 6 though it has
been suggested by Professor Atiyah that property in moneys paid to the
minor may not pass and that they are, therefore, amenable to recovery
in an in rem claim in money had and received so long as they remain
traceable."" The in personam quasi-contractual claims appear to be barred
by application of the implied contract theory. The minor cannot be
liable ex contractu, it is said,"" and this precludes any liability in money
had and received, or in any other common count, where the substance
of the claim is ex contractu rather than ex delicto. In Cowern v. Nield, " 9
a minor who traded in hay and straw undertook to supply the plaintiff
with clover and hay. The minor delivered rotten clover which was
properly rejected by the plaintiff, and failed to deliver the hay. The
plaintiff sued to recover moneys paid as a partial payment of the
contract price, either as damages for breach of contract or as money
had and received. The minor successfully raised his infancy as a
defence to both claims. Only in circumstances where the defendant
was guilty of fraud, and was therefore liable ex delicto, could the
claim have succeeded. 20  Similarly, in R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill, 121 the
English Court of Appeal denied a claim brought by a moneylender in
money had and received to recover moneys lent to a minor who had
fraudulently misrepresented that he was of full age. Moreover, it was
held by the Court that any attempt to recover in a tort action for deceit
would run aground on the principle that, "Although an infant may be
liable in tort generally, he is not answerable for a tort directly connected
with a contract which, as an infant, he would be entitled to avoid.'.' 
22
Although writers have strongly criticized both the reasoning and the result
of each of these cases,12 3  it is evident that they create a serious
l'"Stock v. Wilson, and Watts v. Seymour, supra, footnote 21. Cf McBride v. Appleton, supra, footnote 21.
1"Atiyah, supra, footnote 89, at 283-285, relying by analogy on the proposition advanced by Lord
Haldane in Sinclair v. Brougham et al., [1914] A.C. 398, at 420 L.J. Ch. 465, at 476, to the
effect that the proprietary remedy at law for money lent under an ultra vires agreement would
persist, so long as the money were traceable, until a debtor/creditor relationship intervened. The
sole virtue of this approach is that it provides for at least some recovery - albeit anomalously
only for identifiable money - in the context of rules which are generally perceived as being too
hostile to claims by the other party. A more satisfactory approach, it is suggested, would be to hold
that all property passes to the minor but that in appropriate circumstances, in personam claims
against the minor are allowable. See infra, the text at footnotes 141 to 142.
'"See,e.g. Bristow v.Eastman (1794), 1 Esp. 172 at 173,170 E.R. 317; Cowern v.Nied, [191212 K.B. 419at423,
81 L.J. K.B. 865 at 867; R. Leslie Ltd v. Siwill, [1914] 3 K.B. 607, at 612-613, 83 L.J. K.B. 1145,
at 1149 per Lord Sumner, at 621-622 (K.B.), 1154 (L.J. K.B.) per Kennedy J., and at 626 (K.B.),
1157 (L.J. K.B.) per A. T. Lawrence J.
I Ibi&
'10A new trial was ordered on the issue of whether the minor had obtained the money by fraud.
"'Supra, footnote 118.
"'Ibid., at 611 (K.B.), 1148 (L.J. K.B.), per Lord Sumner. And see ibid., at 620 (K.B.), 1153
(L.J. K.B.)per Kennedy J., and at 625 (K.B.), 1156 (L.J. K.B.),per A. T. LawrenceJ.
123See, e.g., Goff and Jones, supra, footnote 3, at 22-23 and 313-314.
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impediment to the granting of in personam restitutionary relief at common
law. To summarize, the other party probably has no proprietary remedy
at common law, except, perhaps, in the case of money paid to the minor,
no remedy in tort unless the tort is not "directly connected" with the
contract, and no in personam remedy in quasi-contract except in cases where
the liability is in substance ex delicto and it is appropriate to waive the
tort and sue in assumpsit. 124
The rules of equity afford a greater measure of relief for the other
party. In the first place, money lent which is used by the minor to
purchase necessaries or land may be recoverable under the doctrine of
subrogation.1 25 Second, if the suggestion that property in money does not
pass to the minor under an "absolutely void" agreement be accepted,126
it is arguable that the equitable tracing rules may be applied in aid of the
other party's claim to follow the money into its product.1 2 7 Third, and
perhaps most importantly, there is authority for the granting of an equity
of restitutiont2 to the other party in situations where the minor has
acted fraudulently. In Stocks v. Wilson, 1 29 Lush J. put forward an inter-
pretation of this doctrine in terms very favourable to the interests of
the other party. The defendant minor had induced the plaintiff to
supply him with non-necessary goods on credit by misrepresenting his
age. Having taken delivery of the goods, the defendant then resold a
portion of them and granted a bill of sale on the rest as security for a
loan. He then refused to pay the contract price. After the defendant
had attained his majority, the plaintiff sued to recover, inter alia, the
reasonable value of the goods supplied. Lush J., allowing recovery of
the proceeds of the resale and the borrowing, remarked: l5 0
What the Court of Equity has done in cases of this kind is to prevent the
infant from retaining the benefit of what he has obtained by reason of his
fraud. It has done no more than this, and this is a very different thing from
making him liable to pay damages or compensation for the loss of the other
party's bargain. If the infant has obtained property by fraud he can be
compelled to restore it; if he has obtained money he can be compelled to
..
4 See Bristow v. Eastman, supra, footnote 118 (minor who embezzled his master's money held
liable in money had and received). On waiver of tort generally, see Goff and Jones, supra, footnote
3, c. 33.
... Supra, footnotes 98 and 99.
'"Supra, footnote 117.
'Professor Atiyah argues persuasively on several grounds against the orthodox view that a fiduciary
relationship is required in English law to permit the application of equitable tracing rules:
(i) there is no reason to require the relationship in any case where property at law has not passed
(sembe on the theory that, a fortor, property would not pass in equity); (ii) in any event the
fiduciary requirement may be met by impressing the funds in the minor's hands with a resulting
trust; (iii) it may not be necessary to establish a fiduciary relationship if fraud can be established.
See Atiyah, supra, footnote 89, at 288 to 290.
"'It is clear that the remedy is restitutionary in nature only and would not enable enforcement
of the contract. See Levene v. Brougham (1909), 25 T.L.R. 265 (C.A.).
'"Supra, footnote 21.
'
85lbid, at 242-243 (K.B.), 602 (L.J. K.B.).
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refund it. If he has not obtained either, but has only purported to bind
himself by an obligation to transfer property or to pay money, neither in a
Court of Law nor a Court of Equity can he be compelled to make good his
promise or to make satisfaction for its breach.
Moreover, Lush J. was of the view that Equity's jurisdiction was in
personam in nature rather than proprietary and, hence, that the minor
could be called upon to account for the proceeds out of his general
assets. 13'
If Mr. Justice Lush's remarks can be coupled with the traditionally
broad view of the nature of fraud taken by the courts of equity, the
equitable in personam restitutionary claim would afford relief to the other
party in a wide range of circumstances. Certainly, a misrepresentation of
age will be considered fraudulent for these purposes..32  Indeed, despite
the existence of modern dicta restricting the rule to such cases,
133
support may be found for the view that the mere fact that the minor
wishes to retain the property which he has obtained while at the same
time pleading infancy as a defence to a claim for its value, is fraudulent
conduct in the requisite sense. In an earlier case, Clarke v. Cobley,13 4 a
minor had given a bond to a creditor in return for a surrender by the
creditor of promissory notes issued by the minor's wife. The bond being
unenforceable, the creditor was permitted to recover the notes even
though the report of the case does not expressly indicate that a fraudulent
misrepresentation of age had been made. 3 ' Although it has now been
"IMbid., at 247 (K.B.), 604 (LJ. K.B.). Lush J. relied, inter aha, on Re King, Ex parte Unity Joint
Stock Mutual Banking Association (1858), 3 De G. & J. 63, 44 E.R. 1192, 27 L.J. Bk. 33, in which an infant
bankrupt who had obtained a loan from the claimant banking association by traudulently misstating his
age, was held liable for repayment of the debt. The claimant did not obtain a priority over the general
creditors and the case therefore suggests that an in personam, duty to pay can be imposed. And see,
Maclean v. Dummett (1869), 22 L.T. 710 (P.C.). Re King was doubted by the Court of Appeal,
though not overruled, in R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheil, supra, footnote 118, at 616-617 (K.B.), 1151-1152
(L.J. K.B.), per Lord Sumner. See also, Miller v. Blank/ey (1878), 38 L.T.R. 527. For authority
indicating that although the infant ought not be held liable for the debt (as in Re King), a duty
to make restitution would nonetheless be imposed, see Bartlett v. Wells (1862), 1. B. & S. 836,
31 L.J. Q.B. 57, 121 E.R. 924 De Roo v. Foster (1862), 12 C.B. (N.S.) 272, 142 E.R. 1148. Cf.
Ldmprire v. Lange, supra, footnote 84, in which it was held that a lessor could bring an action
to avoid a lease induced by a misrepresentation of age by the infant lessee, but could not recover
the value of use and occupation up to the time of avoidance; senble, because this would permit the
lessor to approbate and reprobate. On the contrary, it is submitted that allowing such recovery
would merely effect restitution.
"31See, e.g., Nelson v. Stocker (1859), 4 De G. & J. 458, 45 E.R. 178; Maclean v. Dummett, ibid;
Bartlett v. Wells, ibid.; DeRoo v. Foster, ibid.; Goyer v. Morrison (1878), 26 Gr. 69 (Ont.); Jewel v.
Broad (1909), 19 O.L.R. I (H.C.), atid (1909), 20 O.L.R. 176 (D.C.); Noble's Lt.& v. BeUleeur,
supOra, tootnote 92.
"'Stikemnan v. Dawson (1847), 1 De G & Sm. 90 at 103, 63 E.R. 984, at 990, 16 L.J. Ch. 205 at 212;
Ex. parte Jones (1881), 18 Ch.D. 109, 50 L.J. Ch. 673 at 678; Re Hodson, [1894] 2 Ch. 421, at 427;
Confederation Life Association v. Kinnear (1896), 23 O.A.R. 497 at 499, per Haggarty C.J.O.
134(1789), 2 Cox 133, 30 E.R. 80.
3"5 Atiyah, supra, footnote 89 at 273 to 276 relies on the following as authority for the view that
equity will take a broader approach to fraud than law in dealing with infants: Savage v. Foster
(1723), 9 Mod. 35; 88 E.R. 299; Watts v. Cressivell (1714), 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 515, 22 E.R. 435; Earl of
Buckinghamshire v. Drury, supra, footnote 66; Cory v. Gertcken (1816), 2 Madd. 40, 56 E.R. 250; Overton
v. Bannister (1844), 3 Hare 503, 67 E.R. 479; Wright v. Snowe (1848), 2 De G. & Sm. 321, 64 E.R.
144. Further support for this view is to be found in Salmond and Williams on Contracts (2d ed.), 319.
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clearly established that a mere nondisclosure of age which is not
accompanied by an enrichment of the minor will not be considered
"fraudulent" in the broader equitable sense, 136 there is much force in
Professor Atiyah's submission that, "There is nothing in the later cases
which detracts from the authority of the earlier cases, and these clearly
show that for an infant to attempt to obtain something for nothing is,
in effect, fraud in the eye of equity."'' 3
7
Even if this broader view of the meaning of fraud in this context is
to be accepted, it must be considered whether, or to what extent, Mr.
Justice Lush's view of the breadth of the equity of restitution, which is
contingent on the finding of fraud, survives the decision of the English
Court of Appeal in R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill.13 8 Although the Court did
not overrule Stocks v. Wilson, Lord Sumner did say that Mr. Justice Lush's
statement of the equitable jurisdiction to require restitution was "open to
challenge." Further, his Lordship had, "difficulty in seeing what liability
to account [for the proceeds] there can be.' 39 In any event, he would not
apply such a doctrine to the facts of the case at hand, since the money
borrowed by the defendant minor had apparently been used by him,
and thus, "no question of tracing it, no possibility of restoring the very
thing got by the fraud," remained. Similarly, A. T. Lawrence J., in the
course of reviewing the authorities, commented, "If when the action is
brought both the property and the proceeds are gone, I see no ground
upon which a Court of Equity could have founded its jurisdiction.' 40
Although the reasoning of the court may be considered obiter insofar as
it treats of matters beyond the case at hand - the borrowing of money
by a minor followed by dissipation of the proceeds of the loan - it is
clear that in the opinion of the Court, the equity of restitution relied
on by Lush J. is to be considered proprietary in nature.
Restricting the other party to. proprietary remedies has the obvious
merit of protecting the impecunious or irresponsible minor who has
dissipated or lost the value of the benefit conferred. Moreover, artful
application of the equitable tracing rules may go some considerable
distance in the direction of affording a remedy against any minor who
has money in hand.' 4' However, it is submitted that the proprietary
approach to restitutionary relief in this context is unsatisfactory for a
number of reasons. It would have the effect of giving priority, in the
case of the insolvency of the infant, to a supplier of non-necessary
"MStikeman v. Dawson, and Ex parte Jones, supra, footnote 133. And see Atiyah, supra, footnote 89 at 275.
1"Supra, footnote 89, at 275.
"'Supra, footnote 118.
Ibid., at 619 (K.B.), 1153 (L.J. K.B.).
"'Ibid, at 637 (K.B.), 1157 (L.J. K.B.).
"'Supra, footnote 127.
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goods over a supplier of necessaries. Further, it places recovery on the
ground of traceability and leaves open the question of whether a fiduciary
duty and/or fraud of some unspecified nature must be established in
order to trace under the equitable rules.14 Finally, if accepted, it would
draw anomalous distinctions between traceable benefits, such as goods,
and untraceable benefits, such as services.
Goff and Jones 14' have attempted to preserve the broader views
expressed by Lush J. in Stocks v. Wilson by restricting the rationale of
R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill to the case of loans to minors, on the theory that
the ordering of repayment of moneys borrowed would constitute a more
direct attack on the underlying policy of protection of minors than would
an in personam duty to account for proceeds of a re-sale of goods supplied.
However, there appear to be difficulties with this suggestion. Although
this writer would view sympathetically any attempt to restrict the scope of
R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill, it is difficult to see any basis in policy for
distinguishing between an in personam duty to repay money borrowed
from the plaintiff and an in personam duty to repay money acquired at
the plaintiff's expense by taking delivery of his goods and re-selling
them. If the proprietary theory were to be accepted in one context, it
would seem to be dispositive of the other as well. A sound rationalization
of the English law of restitution in this area awaits an abandonment
of the "implied contract" fiction and an adoption of the proposition
suggested by some Canadian courts, to the effect that in appropriate
circumstances a duty to make restitutio in integrum can be imposed on a
minor who wishes to rely on the unenforceability of his undertaking
and, at the same time, retain benefits conferred by the other party.
Certainly, if the dicta expressed in R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill are to be considered
authoritative, English courts are much less accommodating of the resti-
tutionary interests of the other party than are their Canadian counter-
parts. 144
E. CONCLUSION
It has been correctly said that the law of minors' contracts, "is complex,
and the complexities of the law are not related to the needs of persons
affected by it."1 45 The intricate and unsettled nature of the rules on
14Supra, footnote 127.
4
'Supra, footnote 3, at 319-320. Goff and Jones have expressed as their preferred view, however,
that the policy against unjust enrichment ought to prevail in these circumstances and they therefore
favour the over-ruling ofR. Leslie Ltd. v. Scheili.
'
4 Supra, the text at footnote 138 et. seq. Ironically, the one modern Canadian appellate decision
which appears to accept the view that R. Leslie Ltd. v. She/// has over-ruled Stocks v. Wilson, adopts a
position, relying on American authority, which goes considerably beyond the proprietary theory
advanced in R. Leslie Ltd. v. SheilL See Noble's Ltd. v. Bellefleur, supra, footnote 92 (dictum: infant
liable in personam for the value of benefits retained upon attaining majority whether or not they
have been subsequently wasted or disposed of.)
145The Latey Report, sup, footnote 7, s.273.
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enforceability and restitution evidence the extreme difficulty encountered
by the courts in their attempt to develop a mechanism for adjusting the
conflicting interests of inexperienced youth, on the one hand, and the
supplier in good faith of money, goods or services, on the other. Some
observers have taken the view that the law in this area is beyond judicial
repair and that a sound restatement of the law can be effected only by
legislative enactment. A review of the Canadian case law suggests,
however, that some steps toward a modern restatement of the doctrine
have already been taken by our courts, and it may be that recognition
of the doctrine of unjust enrichment as the underlying principle in this
area will facilitate both a further rejection of the difficulties presented
by the English analyses of these problems and a continued development
of a more workable set of rules.
The problem of the minor's right to restitution is easily solved.
There is no reason consistent with underlying policy considerations for
denying relief. The difficulty presented by the English case law is that
money cannot be recovered by the minor unless there has been a total
failure of consideration. Canadian courts, on the other hand, have moved
toward acceptance of a general principle that the minor is entitled to
restitution, provided that he makes restitution to the other party.1 46
Analysis of the restitutionary rights of the other party who has
supplied money or non-necessary goods or services presents a more
intractable problem. The alternative approaches which may be derived
from the English cases present something of a dilemma. To restrict the
other party to proprietary relief, as the English Court of Appeal suggested
in R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill, is consistent with the policy of protection of minors
but has seemed to a number of courts to unfairly prejudice the other party.
Moreover, as has been indicated, there are a number of anomalies
inherent in rules premised on a proprietary theory of restitutionary relief.
On the other hand, the adoption of a general rule permitting in personam
recovery against the minor would appear to undermine the concern to
protect minors. No doubt it is this consideration, in league with the
implied contract theory, which has led the English courts to be - apart
from the exceptions. and inconsistencies canvassed above - generally
unreceptive to these claims. Yet, the understandable impulse to afford
in personam relief in some cases has produced doctrine which is, even
for the law of restitution, remarkably unstable and capricious in its
application. A much more satisafactory approach is indicated by those
Canadian cases which suggest a jurisdiction to require the minor to make
restitutio in integrum to the other party, provided that the jurisdiction,
presumably equitable in nature, need not be exercised where it would
'"Supra, the text at footnote 47 et. seq.
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be inequitable to do So.147 If the conceptualism of the earlier authorities
can be set aside, it will be seen that the courts have been willing to impose
a duty to restore upon a minor who seizes on his minority as an excuse
for profiting at the expense of the other party, but will refuse to impose
that duty, or will at least restrict the duty to one of restoring only
benefits retained in specie, where the minor has lost or dissipated the
benefit or where the other party is guilty of oppressive conduct. It is
submitted that these themes derived from the existing case law offer
guielines tor the exercise ot an equitable jurisdiction to require the minor
to make a restitutio in integrum in appropriate cases. 4 " To put the point
in modern dress, the duty ought not to be imposed in a particular case
where the policy underlying the rules rendering the transaction unen-
forceable also requires denial of restitutionary relief. In such cases, it
may be said, the enrichment of the minor is not unjust.
A more workable and just remedial mechanism for this area of the
law thus appears to be gradually evolving in the Canadian case law. The
prospects for a thoughtful judicial rationalization of these rules ought not,
however, be considered a basis for avoiding statutory reform of the law of
minors' contracts, though in the interim, it may facilitate a more even-
handed and just disposition of individual cases. This would not be an
insignificant achievement. The leisurely pace of reform in matters of
private law suggests that the "interim" may be a very long time indeed.
"'The Supreme Court of Canada has indicated the existence of a discretion to excuse the party
lacking contractual capacity from making full restitution in the analogous context of contracts unen-
forceable on grounds of mental incompetency. See Wilson v. The King [1938] S.C.R. 317, [1938]
3 D.L.R. 433. Clearly, recovery would not be allowed where the minor had, pursuant to the agree-
ment, rendered a benefit in return for the benefit received. See Toronto Marlboro Major Junior "A"
Hockey Club et al. v. Tonelli ef al. (1977), 18 O.R. (2d) 21, 81 D.L.R. (3d) 403 (H.C.) at 36-37 (O.R.),
418 (D.L.R.), per Lerner J. (hockey-playing contract held not beneficial to minor and therefore
unenforceable; hockey club's claim in quantum meruit for value of training dismissed as the considerations
were "mutual").
1'Cf the proposals of the Latey Committee, Cmnd. 3342, ss. 306-309, and of the Law Reform Com-
mission of British Columbia, in its Report on Minors' Contracts (1976), at 31-32.

